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ARTICLES
TORT LAW IN TRANSITION: TRACING THE
PATTERNS OF SOCIOLEGAL CHANGE
ROBERT L. RABIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
This has been a time of great turbulence for the tort system. Criticism
seems to come from every conceivable direction. Some would dismantle tort
law altogether, replacing it with a regime featuring social insurance and
administrative regulation.' Others would leave the system and its liability
rules more or less intact, but promote various forms of alternative dispute
resolution.2 Still others (probably the majority of its critics) would continue
to rely on tort law for the reparation of accidental harm. At the same time,
however, these critics would tinker with the substantive and remedial rules
in order to meet their concerns about excessive claims, administrative costs,
and award levels.'
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. An earlier version of
this essay was presented as the Monsanto Lecture in Tort Law and Jurisprudence, Nov. 12,
1987. I would like to express my appreciation to Dean Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Associate Dean
Bruce G. Berner, faculty and students of the Valparaiso University School of Law, and to
Richard W. Duesenberg for the hospitality I was shown and the thoughtful comments I re-
ceived on my presentation. I am also grateful to two Stanford colleagues, Tom Grey and Law-
rence Friedman, for their comments on a later version of this essay.
1. See, e.g., Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 559 (1985).
2. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, THE BLAME GAME 128-35 (1986).
3. For two contrasting approaches, compare, Report of the ABA Action Commission
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In response, beleaguered defenders of the system argue that the critics'
main concern is the security of business interests, at the expense of injury
victims who are only pursuing-with steadily growing effectiveness-their
legitimate claims to individualized justice.4 In the midst of the fray, if there
is any common ground among the disputants, it would be on the proposition
that tort liability has evolved dramatically over the past twenty-five
years-an evolutionary process that has transformed a relatively dormant
area of litigation and doctrine into a dynamic, unsettled field that has
aroused considerable public attention. 5
I will take as my point of departure this shared perception that the
stability of the tort system has been dramatically undermined in recent
years. But this essay will not be another effort to diagnose the ills of the
tort system. I have two other objectives in mind. Initially, I will try to iden-
tify with some precision the major changes that have occurred in the tort
system over the past twenty-five years in its handling of accidental harm
cases. Once these transformations have been identified, I will engage in the
more speculative venture of attempting to account for why they have taken
place.
Rather than surveying the universe of accidental harm cases, my anal-
ysis will focus on four areas where tort law appears to have most notably
been transformed since a quarter century ago. I will begin with medical
malpractice, where the doctrinal changes are in some ways least striking,
and, as a consequence, where the marked growth in litigation activity most
clearly requires reference to changes in what is often referred to as the
"legal culture."6 Then, I will turn to products liability, where the doctrinal
changes are more apparent on the surface, but nonetheless require reference
to exogenous factors to explain the dramatic expansion in litigation claims,
administrative costs, and award levels in recent years.
I will next discuss mass tort litigation, a now familiar off-shoot of the
products liability cases, where a twenty-five year reference point yields the
most pronounced changes in the character of tort liability because of the
virtual absence of claims a quarter century ago. Finally, I will address a
generic area, the redefinition of the general duty of due care over the past
to Improve the Tort Liability System (1987) with Report of the Tort Policy Working Group
on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability
and Affordability (1986) (federal inter-agency study sponsored by the Attorney General).
4. See, e.g., Nader, The Assault on Injured Victims' Rights, 64 DENVER U.L. REV.
625 (1988); Habush, The Insurance "Crisis". Reality or Myth? A Plaintiff Lawyers' Perspec-
tive, 64 DENVER U.L. REV. 641 (1988).
5. No one seems to dispute the fact that tort law has been a dynamic field in the past
twenty-five years; the disagreement is on the question of whether these developments have
been for better or worse.
6. On the concept of "legal culture", see L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 30-34 (1985).
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twenty-five years-a phenomenon that has, in an important sense, given
new meaning to the longstanding conceptual foundation of accident law, the
fault principle.
As I have suggested above, in each case my survey of the changing
face of tort law will be for the principal purpose of taking a speculative look
at the social, economic, and political milieu in which legal development has
its wellsprings. We can only begin to decide whether the turmoil in tort law
is for better or worse, let alone whether it is an aberration or a continuing
process of change, after examining the sources of the current unrest.
II. FOUR AREAS OF CHANGE
A. Medical Malpractice
Before 1960, there were a variety of subtle ways in which the tradi-
tional framework of liability for accidental harm, the doctrinal law of negli-
gence, promised far more than it delivered. The area of physician liability is
a particularly revealing illustration. Superficially, medical malpractice was
a "pure" expression of the fault principle: doctors could not claim any of
the various existing immunities from suit or exemptions from a duty of due
care, nor could they rely upon defenses such as assumed risk, which sub-
stantially undercut negligence liability in some other areas. Once a patient
established that his or her doctor had deviated from customary standards of
reasonable medical practice, a prima facie case of liability was made out.7
But as every student of tort law knows, this was only the beginning of
the story. Customary practice was ordinarily determined by reference to the
"same locality" rule, which meant that a doctor needed to satisfy only the
local community standard of due care, and, as a corollary, any alleged
deviation from that standard had to be established by testimony from an
expert familiar with customary practice in the immediate area.8 Such ex-
perts, willing and able to testify for victims of iatrogenic injury, were virtu-
ally impossible to find in most communities.
From the injury victim's perspective, the bleak prospects for success
were undoubtedly reinforced by a deep-seated reluctance to sue. Through
the middle of this century most Americans took their various maladies to a
family physician. The relationship was usually continuing, and, one would
surmise, based upon bonds of respect and familiarity that created a strong
disincentive to litigate, or even perceive, grievances.'
7. See McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549
(1959).
8. Id. at 569-75.
9. See P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 3-29
(1982), emphasizing the factors of professional authority and consolidation of economic power
1988]
Rabin: Tort Law in Transition:  Tracing the Patterns of Sociolegal Chang
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
4 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine with any degree of preci-
sion the extent to which the discouraging prospects for litigation success, as
contrasted to a more fundamental non-litigative ethos, accounted for the
relative infrequency of malpractice claims. Whatever the case, the statisti-
cal evidence clearly supports the proposition that medical malpractice was a
stagnant area of tort law. In her recent study of the medical malpractice
field, Patricia Danzon recounts the findings in a 1974 study undertaken by
the California Medical Association (CMA), which was aimed at determin-
ing the feasibility of a no-fault system for medical injuries." Relying on
experts in forensic medicine, the CMA evaluated a sample of hospital
records in California to determine the incidence of medical negligence in
treating patients. Danzon puts together the CMA findings with data on
claims against hospitalization insurers during the corresponding period, and
she concludes that about one incident in ten of medical negligence identified
in the CMA study actually resulted in a claim for compensation.
Further indirect support for the low level of claiming is found in a
series of studies, indicating that over the past two decades the incidence of
claims against medical practitioners has risen dramatically.,1 There is no
particular reason to think that this substantial growth can be explained by a
corresponding recent dramatic increase in careless behavior by doctors.
These data on claims increases serve as our bridge to the present scene.
By the late 1980s, medical malpractice had experienced two "crises," a dec-
ade apart, and had undergone a complete turnaround from the early 1960s
-a time of low-visibility infrequent claims and modest awards." Along
with the surface indications of substantial statistical growth in claims and
award levels, important doctrinal changes had occurred. The "same local-
ity" rule, inextricably linked to the receding image of isolated rural medical
practice, was replaced by a national standard of practice that reflected con-
temporary urban growth and extended networks of professional
communication.' 3
At about the same time, and partly as a consequence of the more ex-
pansive standard of due care, the so-called "conspiracy of silence," the in-
in explaining the traditional doctor-patient relationship.
10. See P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
18-29 (1985).
11. Compare id. at 59-60 (referring to surveys from 1956 and 1963 that found approxi-
mately 1.3 malpractice claims per 100 doctors each year) with U.S. Government Accounting
Office, Medical Malpractice: Six State Case Studies (1986) (reporting an annual claims rate
against St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., the largest malpractice carrier, of 16.5/100
insured doctors in 1984 and 17.8/100 in 1985). See also U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Report of Its Task Force on Medical Liability and Malpractice (1987).
12. On the initial crisis in the mid-1970s, see DANZON, supra note 10, at 97-117.
13. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 188 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
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jury claimant's inability to secure expert witnesses, began to crumble.14
These developments, in turn, dovetailed with other movements toward
broader liability; in particular, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was more
widely employed and new standards of informed consent were fashioned.1
5
In a sense, these doctrinal moves were subtle: liability continued to
turn on negligence, custom remained conclusive, and causation still was a
prerequisite to recovery. Nonetheless, although no new paradigm of liability
had been announced, by the early 1970s close observers were well aware
that medical malpractice litigation was on a substantial upswing. The num-
ber of claims and the size of malpractice awards both grew.16 Doctrinal
change was clearly but a surface indicator of deeper undercurrents that
were transforming social attitudes toward litigation against physicians.
By the 1970s, the family doctor as depicted in American popular my-
thology had become an endangered species. The post-World War II trend
toward increasing specialization of medical practice threatened both image
and reality.' 7 On its heels came the rise of clinic practice and the develop-
ment of health maintenance organizations. 8 The "delivery of medical ser-
vices" was on a path toward depersonalization-indeed, this new character-
ization of doctoring was itself revealing of the trend. The physician was one
of any number of professionals and skilled tradespersons whose services
were available on an ad hoc basis, as needed; the concept of a continuing
relationship had been seriously eroded.' 9
The depersonalization of medical practice blurred the distinction be-
tween service provider and commodity vendor and, as a consequence, left
physicians vulnerable to the single most powerful ideological theme in post-
1960s tort law, the rise of enterprise liability.'0 The theme, with its dual
edge of broad risk-spreading and enhanced accident prevention that reflect,
respectively, the tort system goals of compensation and deterrence, can be
14. See discussion and references in M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 105 (4th ed. 1987).
15. Id. at 106-16.
16. See P. DANZON, supra note 10, at 151.
17. P. STARR, supra note 9, at 355-59.
18. Id. at 370-72, 396-97.
19. During this same period, there was a pervasive loss of faith in expertise-a growing
distrust of authority figures-that almost certainly had an impact on social attitudes towards
physicians. See Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975
DUKE L.J. 1179, 1185-86. The same general phenomenon may well have contributed to the
widening scope of enterprise liability discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 52-57,
and to the erosion of status relationships discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 105-
07.
20. For a discussion of the rise of enterprise liability in the defective products area
beginning in the 1960s, see Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of
the Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
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identified at least as far back as the workers' compensation movement.21
But in the early 1960s, it ripened into the notion, to be discussed below,
that product harm is a cost of doing business properly assigned to the man-
ufacturer and others in the distribution chain. These parties were regarded
as being in a better position than the injured party to spread the loss and
guard against future recurrences.22
As medical practice came to appear more like an ordinary business
activity, down to the assumption that the doctor was either insured or an
effective self-insurer, the depersonalization of medical practice took on this
added entrepreneurial/enterprise dimension. To the claimant, trial judge,
and juror, medical service came to appear increasingly indistinguishable
from a commodity that ought to satisfy consumer expectations-and those
expectations were on the rise. Beyond doctrinal considerations, the ideology
of enterprise liability served as a generative force to quicken the pace of
claims and increase the size of awards.
Still another perspective on the transformation of medical malpractice
is revealed by examining a recently established niche in the case law, the
"wrongful life" controversy. 23 The cases which have proven most trouble-
some for the courts raise issues of whether a parent's and/or child's claim
for either economic loss or emotional distress should be allowed when a
doctor or testing laboratory fails to utilize properly the latest techniques for
detecting genetic defects before birth.24 The cases run the gamut from dev-
astating ailments that invariably claim the life of an infant before maturity
(such as Tay-Sachs disease) to congenital handicaps which permanently de-
prive the child, and later the adult, of the full range of satisfactions availa-
ble in life (for example, congenital deafness).2 5 When recovery has been
granted, it seems accurate to say that the frontiers of tort law have been
extended-through recognition of a more expansive conception of the duty
of due care.
In fact, the courts have been badly split on whether recovery should be
granted, particularly for emotional distress.26 The children's claims present
perplexing philosophical issues of measuring the damages from diminished
life as compared to no life at all (since the child is claiming, in essence, the
21. See generally Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REv.
235 (1914) (an early lament for the fault principle).
22. See Priest, supra note 20.
23. See M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 14, at 332-46.
24. See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (Down's syndrome); Howard
v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64 (1977) (Tay-Sachs disease).
25. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982)
(deafness); Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1980) (Tay-Sachs disease).
26. See cases cited in M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 14, at 332-46.
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right to have never been born, and, as a consequence, to have avoided the
damage suffered). The parents' claims, in turn, raise the specter of an un-
bounded duty to compensate for various types of emotional distress trig-
gered by the consciousness of a loved one's negligently caused pain and
suffering.
Almost certainly, these cases will remain a relatively minor sub-cate-
gory of malpractice litigation. In a sense, however, the controversies raise
symbolic and social issues more interesting than the question of whether the
courts can establish satisfying limitations on damages. The wrongful life
cases present visible evidence of what can be regarded as a revolution of
rising expectations. If a prospective genetic profile can be developed before
birth; if deformities can be identified in utero; if organs can be transplanted
from one infant to another; in short, if scientific wonders appear to be virtu-
ally unlimited, then why-the prospective tort claimant in effect
asks-should not any failure of diagnosis or treatment be regarded as sub-
standard conduct? This glimmer of a rising public attitude-namely, that
medical science and technology have advanced to the point where any de-
parture from the expected outcome bespeaks carelessness-may have crys-
tallized in the wrongful life claims. If so, these cases add yet another di-
mension to our understanding of the more general phenomenon of rising
claims and awards in malpractice cases.
B. Products Liability
Tort liability for defective products has been twice transformed in this
century-the second major shift coming in the present tort revival of the
past twenty-five years. Before 1900, however, product harm was an area
hardly worth mentioning. Under the nineteenth century approach, tae re-
quirement that the victim of a product injury be in contractual privity with
the defendant served as an effective damper on litigation against product
manufacturers.27 Although the privity bar was undermined by judicially-
created exceptions during the latter part of the century, particularly for a
category of "imminently dangerous" products, there was no generally rec-
ognized duty of due care until the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.,28 decided in 1916.
MacPherson represented the initial transformation of products liability
law. Defective products were brought into the mainstream of doctrinal lia-
bility for accidental harm under the fault principle. But there is nothing to
suggest that product injuries were, as a consequence, singled out as a par-
ticularly critical social problem. On this score, a comparative look at some
27. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 681-82.
28. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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of the other roughly contemporaneous leading sources of accidental harm is
revealing. Study commission reports and legislative activity were devoted to
workers' injuries, auto accidents, and grade-crossing collisions.29 By con-
trast, product defect claims, even after MacPherson, seem to have made
modest demands on the legal system and to have gone unnoticed in the
political forum.30
Perhaps this low-visibility phenomenon is the principal explanation for
the remarkable fact that for more than forty years after MacPherson was
decided the theory of enterprise liability, which had served as the ideologi-
cal foundation for the demise of common law negligence in cases of work-
ers' injuries, made virtually no headway in the consumer injury setting."1
This state of affairs came to pass despite the clearly apparent argument
that product injuries, like industrial accidents, could be viewed as a cost of
production properly assigned to the manufacturing enterprise in order to
better achieve both injury prevention and risk spreading objectives.
Indeed, when the frontal assault on the established law of negligence in
products cases (MacPherson) began, it appeared for the moment that en-
terprise liability theory-and tort law, more generally-would be left by
the wayside. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,32 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court took the major step of enunciating a strict liability approach
in product injury cases on a theory of implied warranty of merchantable
quality. Instead of relying on a tort/enterprise liability nexus, the court
adopted a contract/inequality of bargaining power perspective to displace
negligence.3"
But even this false start (as it turned out) did not occur until 1960.
The post-MacPherson decades had been consonant with the generally tran-
quil world of tort in which the risk-generating behavior of professionals,
business establishments, homeowners, and government officials, let alone
product manufacturers, was taken seriously only when it constituted a de-
parture from ordinary standards of conduct. At the time, there was no dis-
position to view such behavior as an inevitable consequence of routine
29. On workers' injuries, see W. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION 18-26 (1936); on auto accidents, see Committee to Study Compensation for Auto Acci-
dents, Report to the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences (1932);
on grade crossing collisions, see the classic article, Malone, The Formative Era of Contribu-
tory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151-82 (1946).
30. The first comprehensive effort to gather data on the magnitude of the product de-
fect problem resulted in a multivolume report summarized in U.S. Department of Commerce,
Interagency Task Force on Product Liability: Final Report (1976).
31. But see the landmark concurring opinion of Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944).
32. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
33. For elaboration, see Priest, supra note 20, at 507-11.
[Vol. 23
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 [1988], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss1/6
TORT LAW IN TRANSITION
activities. 34
Then, in the early 1960s, a notable doctrinal development took place.
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,35 the California Supreme
Court adopted strict liability for defective products, and, shortly thereafter,
the American Law Institute took a similar position by adding Section 402A
to the Restatement Second of Torts.36 These developments triggered a na-
tionwide movement in which a second paradigm shift in liability for defec-
tive products, rejection of negligence in favor of strict liability, was widely
adopted. In fact, paralleling the malpractice experience, a turbulent era in
products law was ushered in that continues to the present. Since the mid-
1960s, judicial ingenuity has been stretched to the limit by the necessity of
articulating intelligible standards for design defect cases, establishing judi-
cial guidelines for failure to warn controversies, and defining meaningful
defenses and causal limitations in a wide variety of product cases.3" The
movement to strict liability brought products law to center stage, initially as
a focal point of scholarly analysis, but before long as the lightning rod for
criticism and debate over the efficacy of tort law.
Before exploring the roots of change, however, it is essential to get a
clearer image of precisely how wide the reverberations have been in the tort
system at large. As in the medical malpractice context, this inquiry has
both doctrinal and behavioral dimensions. From the doctrinal standpoint,
there is-although, at first blush, it might not appear so-something of a
parallel to the incremental adjustments that characterize the revised version
of fault liability for doctors. On the surface, the departure in the products
area appears more radical; after all, strict liability replaced negligence as
the dominant theory of liability. But the tale is more complex.
At an early stage, it was realized that by establishing an "unreasona-
bly dangerous" limitation on liability for product defects, Section 402A it-
self potentially undermined strict liability as a meaningful alternative to
negligence. Alert to this possibility, the California Supreme
Court-maintaining its influential role in the products area-forthrightly
rejected any such limitation in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,8 holding that
"the necessity of proving that there was a defect in the manufacture or
design" was a sufficient protection against making the manufacturer "the
insurer of its products."3 9
34. There was limited strict liability in some states for food products, but on warranty
grounds associated with the notion of merchantable quality. See, e.g., Ryan v. Progressive
Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
35. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
37. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 694-715.
38. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
39. Id. at 133.
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But this only served to obfuscate the developing law. Any sign of rever-
sion to a "reasonableness" standard might well be rejected in manufactur-
ing defect cases, where liability could be premised exclusively on an injury
due to a unit of the product that deviated from the norm. What was to be
done, however, in design defect cases, where liability was based on the in-
trinsically dangerous character of the entire product line? Unless the manu-
facturer was to be treated as an insurer against every product-related harm,
some constraining definition of "defect" was essential. In another opinion,
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,40 involving an injury attributed to the de-
sign features of a fork-lift loader that overturned, the California Supreme
Court adopted a "risk-utility" test, which is virtually indistinguishable, on
its face, from the negligence standard.
Thus, to the extent that a Barker or Restatement-type test is followed,
design defect cases are governed by a rule of strict liability which seems
nearly tantamount to the classic Learned Hand test for negligence.41 Simi-
larly, in dealing with the claims of failure to warn, the courts have been
explicit about their adherence to a standard of reasonable notice.42
Manufacturing defect cases, by contrast, can be regarded as an area of
"true" strict liability-in the sense that product-related harm is actionable
without reference to risk-utility analysis . 4 But even here certain qualifica-
tions soften the contrast. By the early 1960s, negligence law had adopted
what many viewed as a de facto strict liability standard in a growing num-
ber of manufacturing defect cases, through extensions of the res ipsa loqui-
tur doctrine. Indeed, two decades earlier it had been argued that res ipsa
made the movement to strict liability for product harm a matter of small
consequence.
4
If the earlier treatment of manufacturing defects constituted less than
a pure version of fault, the new approach likewise falls short of pristine
adherence to strict liability. Even after the adoption of strict liability, many
courts (and the Restatement) recognized an exception for a category of un-
avoidably unsafe products regarded as socially beneficial. 45 The limits of
this category, where reasonable care remains the standard, has never been
very well defined. But drug and vaccine cases, in particular, have proven
40. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
41. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). But there is
an important distinction. In Barker, the court shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to
establish non-liability under the risk-utility calculus, after a threshold showing of defective
design.
42. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 697.
43. Id. at 695.
44. See Traynor, concurring in Escola, supra note 31.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment k (1965).
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resistant to strict liability treatment.48 In sum, a strong case can be made
for the proposition that meaningful doctrinal change in the products area
has been far more modest than initially meets the eye-essentially limited
to manufacturing defect cases, and even then, requiring some qualifications.
Nonetheless, it would be a serious error to reach the conclusion that
the triumph of strict liability has been a hollow victory for plaintiffs' inter-
ests. Under the traditional pre-1960s law, there was a fundamental differ-
ence in consumer understanding of the concept of reasonable standards of
product manufacture. The point is most clearly evident in design defect
cases, where the superficial fact that "reasonableness" remains the guiding
standard of liability is quite misleading. To put it simply, prior to the new
era a standardized product as found in the market was taken as the norm of
safety. Whatever the harm suffered, no thought was given to raising ques-
tions about whether the basic design of a product in general use might be
flawed. It was only the unit that malfunctioned when compared with its
product line-the exploding coke bottle was a classic example-that trig-
gered a products claim.
The point is vividly illustrated by the "crashworthiness" doctrine. Ini-
tially, the courts were apprehensive about allowing recovery for post-impact
consequences of an auto accident due to allegedly unsafe design features.4 7
After all, automobiles were made to be driven-not to be involved in acci-
dents. The buyer took the standard product as he or she found it. Unless a
car went out of control, deviating from the performance norms of the prod-
uct line, courts were inclined to invoke a foreseeability limitation. This limi-
tation was invoked even though common sense suggested that post-accident
injuries were surely a regularly occurring consequence of road collisions and
that some makes of cars were less crash-resistant than others.
Strict liability altered this perspective on responsibility for harm. The
guideline of unreasonableness remained salient, but it became more expan-
sive, incorporating the notion that products-even standardized products
performing in accordance with producer expectations-might be intrinsi-
cally harmful, and consequently, could be regarded as "defective."
Thus, the parameters marking out what constituted a colorable claim
were widened by the advent of strict liability. This landmark development,
and the concomitant across-the-board rise in product claims and award
levels, call for some sort of explanation. Just as highway accidents have
been decided for two centuries by reference to the fault principle, product
injuries might have remained under the sway of MacPherson through the
end of the twentieth century and beyond. There was nothing inevitable
46. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318
(1986) (polio vaccine).
47. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
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about the liberalization of defective products law, not to speak of the corre-
sponding growth in claims and award levels.
How is the expansion of products law to be explained then? George
Priest has argued that the erosion of MacPherson was a consequence of the
convergence of two schools of influential legal scholarship in the 1950s and
early 1960s: the work of Friedrich Kessler, on the contracts side, emphasiz-
ing the inequality of bargaining power between manufacturers and consum-
ers, and the writings of Fleming James, on the tort side, highlighting the
risk-spreading potential of liability insurance.48 Eventually, in Priest's view,
James' enterprise liability theory prevailed in the form of strict liability for
defective products. Witness the rejection of Henningsen in favor of
Greenman, mentioned above.49
Without denigrating the influence of legal scholarship, I would suggest
that the transformation of products liability law over the past quarter cen-
tury, and particularly the rapid growth in claims and award levels in recent
years, requires a broader focus. In terms of tort doctrine, the enduring con-
tribution of MacPherson was to substitute a generalized duty of due care
for the traditional status-based paradigm of responsibility for tortious harm.
In doing so, Cardozo had the breadth of vision to weave products liability
deftly into the dynamic pattern of tort law development generally over the
past two centuries.
However, as far as the moral basis of tort responsibility was con-
cerned, Judge Cardozo's approach in MacPherson remained firmly rooted
in the nineteenth century. Product manufacturers might owe a general duty
of care to consumers in Cardozo's view, but his vision of tort liability re-
mained grounded in an individualized determination of carelessness.
Cardozo was a creature of his time. Accident law retained its two-party
focus.
The significance of Greenman and its progeny was in rejecting wrong-
ful behavior as an adequate guide to liability for accidental harm. The cen-
tral thrust of enterprise liability-the underpinning for strict liability doc-
trine-is its singular indifference to conventional moral-based, corrective
justice notions of assigning responsibility for harm. The constant (albeit
rather misleading) litany that these cases focus "upon the safety of the
product, rather than the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct" 50 is
precisely the expression of this point: strict liability for products abandons
the search for careless behavior in favor of an impersonal mechanism for
distributing and responding to risk.
48. See Priest, supra note 20, at 461, 462.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
50. See discussion in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 449-58, 479 A.2d
374, 375-85 (1984).
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Insurance was surely a factor; it highlighted the risk-spreading poten-
tial of enterprise liability and almost certainly was the dominant influence
in the initial adoption of strict liability. But from all appearances, the real
growth in products cases did not begin until almost a decade after Green-
man. Indeed, like medical malpractice, there appears to have been a period
of turbulence in products cases in the early 1970s followed by an even
sharper disturbance in the mid-1980s.51 While doctrinal development, as
discussed, preceded the growing demands on the tort system, it offers only a
partial explanation of the groundswell that developed in the succeeding two
decades.
Throughout the 1960s, the consequences of post-World War II eco-
nomic growth became more apparent. An increasingly affluent society cre-
ated a market for a wide array of technologically sophisticated new prod-
ucts, ranging from drugs and medications to power tools and
lawnmowers-products that generated significant risks to health and safety
along with their readily apparent utility. Similarly, new affluence, suburban
life styles, and the network of interstate highways promoted new levels of
use of the automobile-and soon exacerbated longstanding concerns about
auto safety.
Still, a catalyst was necessary to alter the climate of claims and award
levels in product cases. The Interagency Task Force on Product Liability,
established in 1976 as a response to the first wave of concern about prod-
ucts claims, documented, as best it could with limited data, rapid growth in
claims and award levels in the period between 1970 and 1975.52 But the
explanatory mechanism remained uncertain.
Like medical malpractice, a satisfying explanation necessitates refer-
ence to exogenous circumstances, rather than excessive preoccupation with
internal developments in the tort system. The growing turbulence in tort
law was only a single aspect of deeper stirrings in the surrounding legal
environment. Health and safety concerns had become paramount in the
public mind by the early 1970s. Just a few year earlier, Ralph Nader's
campaign for auto safety had ignited long latent consumerist impulses that
soon spilled over into regulatory reform on a wide variety of fronts in the
name of product safety. 53 The Consumer Product Safety Commission was
established, amidst considerable media attention, and a well-publicized sys-
51. On the early 1970s, see the data on jury trials and awards analyzed in Priest, Prod-
uct Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 188 (R.
Litan & C. Winston eds. 1988). On the mid 1980s, see Attorney General's Task Force Report,
supra note 3.
52. See Department of Commerce Study, supra note 30, at 11-43 to -82.
53. See Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1283-84 (1986).
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tem of monitoring and "prioritizing" consumer injuries was soon in place.
The Federal Trade Commission was revitalized.55 Congress adopted a bevy
of product-specific regulatory schemes, and local consumer complaints of-
fices flourished.56
For present purposes, it is especially important to note that Nader's
prominence in the early 1970s rested not just on consumer safety issues, but
on a broader questioning of the legitimacy and responsibility of existing
institutions, particularly the responsibilities of corporate America to the or-
dinary citizen.57 These sentiments were reflected, in my view, in the re-
moval of intangible barriers to claims consciousness-not unlike the erosion
of the professional mystique of physicians. The technological prowess that
yielded a steadily growing output of consumer products was no longer
viewed as an unmixed blessing. Moreover, the contemporaneous public con-
cern about the environment, focused initially on air and water pollution,
and soon afterwards on toxic harms, almost certainly contributed to the
erosion of deference. 58 Here the public's ambivalence was manifest. Every-
thing that corporate America promised seemed to bear a hidden
cost-unseen risks to health and safety that necessitated accountability. In
tandem, the demand for regulation and compensation expanded, and the
characterization and valuation of personal harms took on a more expansive
aspect.
In sum, doctrinal changes in the products area were the surface indica-
tions of a new social vision of the functions of tort law. The ideology of
enterprise liability was the driving force that initiated these changes. But
even deeper stirrings were taking place. There came to be a radical loss of
faith in the old view that personal injury was the result of isolated failures
on the assembly line. In its stead, a heightened sensitivity arose to the latent
risks in standardized products that appeared to be the ubiquitous conse-
quence of technological and material progress.
54. An early discussion can be found in Kelman, Regulation by the Numbers-A Re-
port on the Consumer Product Safety Commission, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Summer 1974, at
83-102.
55. See H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 7702 (discussing Consumer Products Warranties-Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act).
56. Some of the most significant legislation of this period included the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1966, the Child Protection Act of 1966, the Fair Pack-
aging and Labeling Act of 1966, the Wholesome Poultry Products Act of 1967, the Flamma-
ble Fabrics Act of 1967, the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act of 1968, the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968, the
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, the Child Protection and Safety Toy Act of 1969,
the Fire Research and Safety Act of 1969, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.
57. For a contemporaneous account, see R. BUCKHORN, NADER: THE PEOPLE'S LAW-
YER 279-82 (1972).
58. For discussion, see Rabin, supra note 53, at 1278-84.
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C. Mass Tort
From one perspective, judicial concern about the consequences of a
harmful act that causes multiple claims can be traced back to the era of
Winterbottom v. Wright.59 In that celebrated case Lord Abinger, never a
great friend of tort claimants, drew back in horror from the prospect of
awarding damages to a coachman injured by the capsizing of his vehicle;
recovery against the supplier of the coach might lead to "the most absurd
and outrageous consequences"-in the next such accident every passenger
might enter a claim for damages!
As we have just seen, the privity limitation on recovery for product
injuries, enunciated in Winterbottom, eventually passed into tort history as
a consequence of MacPherson. But whether courts have relied on privity,
proximate cause, or lack of duty as the limiting principle, there has been a
longstanding unease over the prospect of tort recovery for multiple claims
arising out of a single course of conduct.80 Only in the modern era, as
courts have come to terms with the fact that mass transport-and particu-
larly airline travel-foreseeably poses collective risks on passengers, has the
mass tort action attained general acceptability.
Once the courts came to terms with the sheer magnitude of cata-
strophic loss, the substantive law applicable to the traditional claims usually
presented no particular problems. Indeed, twenty-five years ago multiple
claims cases fell so neatly within established doctrinal categories of negli-
gence and strict liability, and seemed so clearly to be an occasional distur-
bance on the landscape of accident law, that no observer of the tort scene
would have characterized the cases as a distinct category of liability."
In recent years, all of that has changed dramatically. Asbestos, Agent
Orange, Dalkon Shield, DES, and Bendectin, among other highly-publi-
cized mass tort controversies, conjure up images of the dark side of the
chemical and pharmaceutical revolution that has occurred since 1960. The
toxics and drug cases have not just stimulated a dormant area of accidental
harm, as in the cases of medical malpractice and products liability; rather,
they have given rise to an entirely new and distinct set of demands on the
tort system.62
59. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
60. See Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassess-
ment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985).
61. The two leading torts texts of the period, F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS (1956) and W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1955), bear no
index or table of contents listing for mass or multiple injury torts as distinguished from the
traditional concern over "a flood of litigation."
62. See D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON, TRENDS IN TORT LITI-
GATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 1-11 (1987).
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Consider, on this score, the emerging empirical data on mass tort
cases. In an effort to disaggregate accidental harm claims, a recent publica-
tion of the Rand Institute for Civil Justice (ICJ) provides a breakdown of
its accumulating body of data into three categories: "routine" personal in-
jury torts (auto suits), "high-stakes" personal injury litigation (such as
products and medical malpractice suits), and "mass latent injury" cases
(including asbestos, Dalkon Shield, and the like).6"
By far, the most substantial growth in claims and administrative costs
is found in the latter category. Regarding administrative costs, the ICJ
finds that net compensation to victims as a percentage of total litigation
expenditures falls from 52% in routine cases, to 43 % in high stakes and
37% in mass latent injury cases. 4 A similar pattern emerges from the
available trend data on claims growth during the early 1980s. The rise in
auto cases appears to be modest, the increase in products cases considerable
(as noted earlier), and the growth in mass tort truly dramatic:
There is little ambiguity about the trends in the third category
of cases-mass latent injuries. Data from asbestos and Dalkon
Shield claims demonstrate truly explosive growth for these types
of cases. For example, most experts estimate that there were
about 16,000 asbestos worker injury claims in 1981; five years
later, there were more than 30,000 asbestos cases in state and
federal courts. In 1981, there were an estimated 7,500 lawsuits
pending over injuries from Dalkon Shields. By 1986, after A.H.
Robins, the manufacturer, had sought protection under Chapter
11, more than 325,000 claims had been submitted to the bank-
ruptcy court.65
By inference, if the number of claims in the most highly publicized
mass tort cases has grown exponentially in the past few years, the aggre-
gate damages in these cases would describe a similar pattern, as long as
average awards remain at least constant. The omnipresent threat of insol-
vency complicates any such projections. Clearly, however, the overall pic-
ture of claims, awards, and costs indicates increasingly severe strains on the
tort system as a consequence of the phenomenal growth in the mass tort
area.
Once again, doctrinal change has been the least significant chapter in
this saga of explosive growth. In recent years, the prospects for establishing
a primafacie case of liability have closely tracked the development of strict
liability for defective products and the natural evolution of strict liability
63. Id. at 2-3.
64. Id. at 27-28.
65. Id. at 10.
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for ultrahazardous activities. But the propensity to litigate and the prospect
of success have been powerfully influenced by factors extraneous to the net-
work of tort rules.
To understand the seismic dimensions of the mass tort phenomenon, as
well as the doctrinal accommodations that have occurred, it is initially es-
sential to identify the distinctive characteristics of the kinds of cases that
have emerged in recent years. In an earlier essay on environmental tort
liability, I referred to these traits as problems of identification, boundaries,
and source.6 For present purposes, I will briefly recapitulate that earlier
discussion, highlighting the doctrinal innovations that have been fashioned
as part of the larger effort (mostly unsuccessful, in my view) to domesticate
these cases within the confines of the tort system.
By problems of identification, I have in mind the causal determination
that the victim in fact has suffered an injury that can be attributed to tort-
type circumstances rather than the ordinary risks of life. Traditionally, this
determination posed no problem because mass torts fell within the everyday
conception of accidental harm. Thus, the type of injury suffered by a group
of accident victims in an airplane crash or the collapse of a public building
was no different in kind from the broken bones and lacerations experienced
by an individual victim of an exploding soda bottle or a car crash.
By contrast, the new mass torts ordinarily result from pathologies that
ripen into conditions of disease over a lengthy period of time. The etiology
of the illness is frequently in question: Was the malady caused by a particu-
lar toxic substance, or is it simply a consequence of one among the many
background risks of everyday life (or a genetic predisposition) that we re-
main at a loss to identify with certainty?
The main doctrinal response to the problem of identification has been
to remove a traditional handicap the injury victim otherwise experiences.
Although the tort system has been helpless to redirect the causation inquiry
away from novel epidemiological questions, some courts have adopted the
strategy of shifting the burden of uncertainty about the source of harm
from the victim to the allegedly responsible party.6 7 Traditionally, of
course, that burden fell on the claimant as part of his or her prima facie
case. But in recognition of the product manufacturer's generally superior
access to information about risk, some courts have been disposed, in recent
years, to alter the rule.
The strong version of this tendency is illustrated by the widely-noted
66. Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 Hous. L. REv. 27, 29-33
(1987).
67. Note that this strategy was adopted for design defect cases generally as early as
Barker, supra notes 40-41.
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case of Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,6" in which the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that information about the health risks of as-
bestos arising after the time of product distribution was to be attributed to
the producer in determining whether adequate warnings had been given.
But the decision led to such a critical uproar that within two years the same
court recanted, limiting the case to its facts. In Feldman v. Lederle Labora-
tories,69 involving after-acquired information about the side-effects of a pre-
scription drug, the same court held that the maker of a product generally
would be responsible only for reasonably attainable knowledge about pro-
spective harmful consequences.
Beshada, in fact, has not been widely followed elsewhere."0 Thus, al-
though an ex post approach to product risk-a "true" version of strict lia-
bility-has seen the light of day, it is probably on the wane. Like other
aspects of products liability law discussed earlier, the fault standard of rea-
sonable diligence remains the test of responsibility for identification of risk
in mass tort cases.
Nonetheless, even though identification in these cases remains
grounded in reasonable care, a more robust version of the fault principle is
applicable than existed prior to the 1960s--once again mirroring trends
elsewhere in products liability doctrine. Although Beshada was quickly lim-
ited to its facts, the New Jersey court adopted the strategy mentioned
above, shifting to the defendant the burden of establishing that adequate
care had been taken to identify risks of harm associated with a marketed
product.71
A second distinctive feature of the new mass tort cases is the problem
of boundaries. I have in mind the singular array of damage claims in the
cases, based on psychological distress about victimization or physical mani-
festations that show up in later-born generations. 2 The broad range of toxic
and environmental cases systematically generate these types of harm,
which have only occasionally triggered injury claims in the past.
Once again, the dimensions of the problem can be highlighted by treat-
ing the traditional mass tort case as a point of reference. Falling airplanes
and collapsing skylights result in broken bones and smashed skulls-an as-
sortment of harms that is translated into money damages in essentially the
68. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
69. 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
70. See cases cited in Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Laboratories), 44 Cal. 3d 1049,
1060, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 421-22, 751 P.2d 470, 480 (1988), in which the California Supreme
Court rejected a strict liability test for prescription drugs.
71. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 458, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
72. The DES cases are a representative example. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982).
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same way that accidental injury cases have been evaluated for centuries.
The new mass tort cases are quite another matter. Many of the most publi-
cized cases such as DES, Bendectin, and the atomic testing controversies,
involve a significant number of claims by injury victims who were either in
utero at the time of exposure/ingestion or born .at a much later date with
alleged genetic defects.73 Other claims, by the initially exposed victim or
the later-born child, are for the trauma of fearing that they will join the
ranks of presently identified victims of the same exposure, or for medical
monitoring to detect early warning signs of pathological disorder.7 4
These cases raise "boundary" problems of one sort or another in the
sense that the range of damage claims associated with a given mass tort
incident is far less easily determined than in traditional multiple injury situ-
ations.7 5 The resulting demands on the tort system pose a fresh dilemma. If
the claims are allowed, still another form of intangible loss-subject to the
conflicting expert testimony of mental health professionals-is introduced
into the system .7 Further subtleties abound. Will phobic reactions become
a self-fulfilling prophecy once the legitimacy of such claims is acknowl-
edged? Can the magnitude of tangible harm claims-let alone the tidal
wave of singular emotional distress claims-be assessed before the fact,
given the bizarre pathologies associated with toxic and drug-related
injuries?
Until now, the judicial response to boundary issues has been on the
cautious side. While some courts have been willing to entertain documented
claims of economic loss for medical monitoring, the courts have been less
receptive to affirmations of pure emotional distress. 77 By far, the dominant
claims growth in this area remains linked to injuries grounded in the physi-
cal consequences of exposure to drug and toxics. Still, the pervasive uncer-
tainty discernible in these boundary cases-uncertainty about acknowledg-
ing psychological distress as well as assessing the likelihood of future
physical harm-highlights from yet another angle the novelty of the de-
mands placed on the tort system by the new variety of mass tort cases.
The third distinctive characteristic of the new mass tort cases can be
73. For a further discussion of the Nevada test site cases, see H. BALL, JUSTICE DOWN-
WIND (1986). See also P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (enlarged ed. 1988).
74. See generally Gale & Goyer, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of
Cancer, 35 DEFENSE L.J. 443 (1986). Compare Dartez v. Fiberboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th
Cir. 1985) with Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1986).
75. Punitive damage issues have also contributed to the uncertainty over boundaries.
For discussion of the punitive damage problem, see Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The
Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1 (1985-86).
76. Earlier, a similar concern about expanding the boundaries of intangible loss in
cases of negligently caused emotional harm was reflected in a no-duty rule that prevailed until
the 1960s. See discussion in text, infra at notes 109-14.
77. See sources supra note 74.
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referred to as problems of source. I have in mind the question of whether
the party responsible for manufacture, release, or handling of the suppos-
edly harmful substance can be identified. This issue is distinct from and
presupposes an affirmative answer to the question of whether a tort-type
injury can be discerned (the problem of identification). Once again, the
problem can be highlighted by reference to traditional mass tort cases.
In those earlier cases, the question of identifying the source of a mass
tort injury virtually never arose. If a railroad boxcar exploded, leveling a
town, everyone knew who to blame. So, too, did the survivors of a falling
airplane or a collapsing coliseum roof. Occasionally, there might be an issue
whether the accident could properly be attributed to faulty construction on
the one hand, or improper maintenance, on the other. For the most part,
however, assignment of responsibility was no problem-assuming liability
could be otherwise established. Indeed, the leading precedents memorialized
in tort case books on problems of source have nothing to do with multiple
claims controversies-they are quaint fact situations involving the luckless
victims of trigger-happy members of a hunting party and such. 78
Toxics and drug cases are quite another matter. The hazardous waste
scenario is especially illuminating. Any number of generators, transporters,
and operators may have contributed, over a period of time, to the ground-
water or surface pollution that results in multiple injury claims. The tort
system faces the responsibility of determining which, among the parties,
should be held liable. Similarly, a particular drug or substance that results
in multiple injury claims may be a generic product that was produced by a
large number of pharmaceutical houses. The claims may arise long after
the product has been marketed, so that the problems of attribution are
overwhelming. Once more, the tort system confronts the challenge of pro-
viding a just mechanism for assigning responsibility.79
The courts, ever-engaged in fashioning doctrine for the problem at
hand, have not been indifferent to these claims. In the leading case of
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,8" involving the personal injury claim of a
DES daughter who could not identify the precise source of the miscarriage
preventative her mother had taken a generation earlier, the California Su-
preme Court advocated an innovative approach to liability. The court held
that an injury victim could establish cause in fact by identifying the pro-
ducers of a "substantial market share" of the harmful product-with re-
sponsibility allocated on a market share basis among those defendants iden-
78. The classic case is Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
79. See generally Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environ-
mental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 575 (1983).
80. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
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tified as manufacturers of the product. In such a case, featuring a generic
product manufactured by a number of sources, precise identification of the
maker of the particular units or doses that actually harmed the injured
party would no longer be required.
The creativity of the Sindell approach has been duly noted, and its
expansive possibilities discussed by commentators." No one denies that the
case is yet another indication of the dynamic character of tort law in the
present era. Whatever one's reaction to the court's approach, however, the
reality is that very few mass tort cases have Sindell characteristics. By con-
trast, most multiple claims cases involve an allegedly responsible party that
can be identified in the traditional way. Market share liability has not, in
itself, dramatically altered the rules of the game for most players.
Indeed, for all the hue-and-cry over the inequitable consequences of
recent application of the joint and several liability doctrine, it too, can only
be cast as a minor villain in the piece.8 2 Whatever the future holds, the fact
is that virtually all the multiple claims cases that have proven so disruptive
to the tort system until now have involved injuries based on the side-effects
of drugs or toxic substances-such as Dalkon Shield, asbestos, atomic radi-
ation, Bendectin, and the like-where the responsible party is well-known;
cases where the defendant is indeterminate are the exception.83
In sum, problems of identification, boundaries, and source have gener-
ated new judicial strategies as courts have struggled to fashion doctrinal
responses to the perplexing issues raised by mass tort claims. But Beshada,
Sindell, and the other benchmarks of this effort have neither triggered nor,
on the other hand, have they done much to constrain the enormous de-
mands on the system. The controversies seem almost to have taken on a life
of their own, assuming proportions that were not foreseen and wreaking
havoc on the ordinary institutional mechanisms for resolving claims of acci-
dental harm.
What has happened in the recent past to trigger these extraordinary
demands? At one level, the answer is transparently clear. Through inadver-
tence, heedlessness, and perhaps a strong measure of corporate indifference,
81. See, e.g., Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES
Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982); Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact
Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881 (1982).
82. Recent legislative initiatives revising the rule of joint and several liability are cited
in Tort Policy Working Group, An Update on the Liability Crisis 68 (1987).
83. Consider, however, the perplexing problems created by joint and several liability in
clean-up cases under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA), discussed in Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1459, 1527-33 (1986). A similar set of difficulties would be faced if widespread
personal injury and property damage claims in these cases come to fruition.
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we have been overwhelmed by the massive tragedy of asbestos exposure."'
In turn, the asbestos phenomenon offers the key to understanding other
mass tort episodes. Countless victims are claimed by the unanticipated
health risks, latent and long developing, that reside in a variety of drugs
and synthetic products which appeared to offer either surcease from pain
or, in some cases, simply a richer tapestry of life's comforts. As an initial
cut, then, the mass tort phenomenon can be attributed to the post-World
War II revolution in scientific and technological growth-yet another in-
stance of the truism that progress has its costs.85
But the emergence of chemical products as a singular source of risk
cannot explain, in itself, the unprecedented new demands on the tort sys-
tem. Always, there must be the added element of an affirmative disposition
to litigate, a concrete stense of wrongful injury overcoming the presumption
that accidental harm is but a normal risk of life-a presumption, it should
be added, that might be particularly likely in cases of toxic and drug-re-
lated harm where causation is obscured.
In fact, the asbestos claims are a strong case in point because the syn-
ergistic phenomenon-the presence of more than one possible explanatory
factor-is pronounced. Many asbestos victims have been long-term ciga-
rette smokers, and all of the claims arise after many years of exposure to
virtually limitless health risks of various kinds.!" There is no bright-line in-
dicator of where responsibility should fall. Moreover, the asbestos victims
have almost invariably received injury-related benefits from the workers'
compensation system, satisfying one set of expectations for redress. 87 Apart
from recent changes in the climate of tort litigation, then, the deluge of
asbestos claims that has occurred would be anything but a foregone
conclusion.
The missing link in the explanatory chain, as I see it, is the heightened
sensitivity to the unseen dangers of pollution and toxics that emerged
around 1970, as an integral part of the consumer/environmental revolution
discussed above.88 By the early 1980s, this sensitivity-and a correspond-
ingly acute claims consciousness-stood as an accepted part of the legal
84. A strong indictment of the industry is offered in P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MIS-
CONDUCT (1985). The Institute for Civil Justice has conducted a series of empirical studies of
the costs of the asbestos litigation. See, e.g., D. HENSLER, W. SELVIN & P. EBERNER, AsBES-
TOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS (1985) [hereinafter HENSLER].
85. The mass tort asbestos phenomenon, itself, dates back to exposure of shipyard
workers during World War II.
86. See HENSLER, supra note 84, at 41.
87. Richard Epstein has argued that worker's compensation benefits should be the ex-
clusive source of compensation for victims in the asbestos cases. See Epstein, Manville: The
Bankruptcy of Product Liability, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1982.
88. See Rabin, supra note 53.
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culture. If the consumer rights theme seems most evident in the newly
emerging product design litigation of the 1970s, as I have suggested,89 it is
the environmental rights motif that is most pronounced in the mass tort
explosion.
As far back as the early 1960s, Rachel Carson's book, The Silent
Spring,90 focused widespread attention on the ecological impact of the
chemical revolution in pesticide use. Her popular account of the health ef-
fects of toxic poisoning on innocent species of lower-order life was followed
by a number of toxic and drug tragedies elsewhere in the world, claiming
frightening numbers of human victims, that were brought home to the
American public in vivid detail; in particular, the massive suffering set off
by mercury poisoning at Minamata, Japan, and the grotesque array of birth
defects in Europe attributed to the drug Thalidomide.91
By the early 1970s, episodes of this kind no longer seemed isolated in
nature or confined to foreign shores. The Reserve Mining case in Minne-
sota, raising the possibility that asbestos-like tailings might be poisoning the
drinking water supplies of Lake Superior, received nationwide attention.92
The Santa Barbara oil spill, portraying massive devastation of marine life,
shocked the country and contributed mightily to the sense of concern about
environmental risks that culminated in Earth Day, 1980.93 Public percep-
tions of "pollution-related" risks (very broadly defined) had changed dra-
matically: the recent events were catastrophes that could be traced to iden-
tifiable corporate sources, and, in short order, the notion of corporate
responsibility became as closely identified with health risks as with product
safety.
In the Congressional forum, far-reaching air and water pollution regu-
latory schemes were enacted, workplace health and safety legislation was
passed, and toxic waste prevention and clean-up controls were established . 4
The new regulatory agencies were mandated to study and report on emerg-
ing chemical risks in the environment and the workplace as well as designed
to control more stringently existing sources of danger.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 52-58.
90. R. CARSON, THE SILENT SPRING (1962).
91. For a discussion of the impact of Thalidomide, see H. SJOSTROM & K. NIELSSON,
THALIDOMIDE AND THE POWER OF THE DRUG COMPANIES (1972). For discussion of the Mina-
mata tragedy, see J. GRESSER, K. FUJIKURA, & A. MORISHIMA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN
JAPAN 65-105 (1981).
92. For a case study of Reserve Mining, see R. BARTLETT, THE RESERVE MINING
CONTROVERSY (1980).
93. See W. ROSENBAUM, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 53-91, 136
(1973).
94. The major pollution control regulatory schemes are succinctly summarized in R.
FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Nutshell series, 2d ed. 1988).
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In this atmosphere, there could hardly fail to be a heightened con-
sciousness of the propriety of compensating the individual victims of drug
and toxic-related harm whenever the linkage to perceived corporate irre-
sponsibility arose. Any such compensation-minded demands on the judicial
system were a natural complement to the political impulse to reduce health
and safety risk through regulatory controls. In short, the mass tort revolu-
tion, which comes to fruition in the 1980s, seems grounded in the new envi-
ronmental consciousness that can be traced to the rise of public concern
identifiable a decade earlier.
D. The Duty Concept
In the earlier sections, I have suggested that doctrinal change, in itself,
has played a real but limited role in explaining the major upheavals exper-
ienced by the tort system in the past quarter century. Customary due care
remains, as it was before, the test for liability in medical malpractice cases;
risk-utility analysis is similar in kind to the traditional MacPherson test of
fault liability in defective product cases; established principles of strict lia-
bility and negligence doctrine, construed in an imaginative-but by no
means tendentious-manner have been employed in the mass tort cases;
and so forth. In each of these areas, tort principles were available twenty-
five years ago that could be shaped, cut, and expanded to accommodate a
new litigation consciousness in injury victims and the widespread accept-
ance of enterprise liability thinking. The broad expanse of the fault princi-
ple offered little resistance to this substantial shift in injury victims' asser-
tions of a right to compensation.
In reality, however, the domains of negligence circa 1960 remained far
more circumscribed than this account might suggest. Surveying the field at
large, one still found the heritage of two centuries of historically grounded
limitations on the fault principle.
The overriding constraint was that in order to establish a claim based
on the fault of another, one had the threshold obligation to demonstrate the
existence of a duty of due care. It was here, in the hidden recesses of a wide
variety of no-duty (and limited duty) rules, that a vast number of potential
claims for negligent conduct were extinguished without ever seeing the light
of day. Consequently, it seems fitting that my last illustration of the dra-
matic changes in tort law during the past twenty-five years should include
some of the most significant examples of a broad-ranging phenomenon: the
"purification" of the negligence principle through the widespread abolition
of rules limiting the duty of due care. 5
95. See also Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability,
15 GA. L. REv. 963, 964-70 (1981).
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1. The Erosion of Status
The nineteenth century view of the tort system was highly particular-
ized.9 6 Contrary to widely-accepted beliefs, there was no comprehensive
commitment to the fault principle. As cities grew and industries developed,
a steadily increasing volume of accident cases arose in which the parties
were of distinctly different status. Foremost among these categories was the
workplace injury, where the status differential between employer and em-
ployee led the courts to create strong barriers to recovery-most notably,
assumed risk and the fellow servant rule-which had very little to do with
fault principles. In similar fashion, the privity requirement afforded special,
status-based protection to product manufacturers, despite their careless be-
havior, in suits by injury victims who had no direct dealings with the
defendant.
Nor were these the only such limitations. Still another well-recognized
example of categorical, status-based exemption from the obligation of due
care was the immunity conferred on governmental entities. Consider, as
well, the limited obligations-harking back to pre-capitalist norms of land-
owner protection-imposed on land occupiers to social guests and unwanted
entrants. A generalized duty of due care was simply foreign to the custom-
ary way of thinking about personal harm. To the contrary, the courts were
inclined to examine the particular status relationship between the parties
and create special categories of privileged defendants. This predisposition
rested on narrow, focused assumptions about the obligations of employers,
governmental entities, product manufacturers, and landowners, among
others.
In the interstices among this wide array of limited (and limiting) sta-
tus relationships, a fault principle gradually emerged and became increas-
ingly influential. But its origins were modest. The superstructure of negli-
gence law was crafted from horse-and-buggy collisions and careless
accidents among neighbors and playmates. Prior to this century, the fault
principle in "pure" applications (that is, where it was not overridden by the
earlier mentioned non-fault limitations on liability) was most prominent in
cases where the status relationship of the parties was not a salient feature
of the case.9 7
By the mid-twentieth century, one might have thought that these ob-
96. The discussion that follows draws on a more detailed treatment in Rabin, The His-
torical Development of the Fault Principle. A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981).
97. These cases did, at times, include claims against industry, particularly the rail-
roads; but those cases tended to arise in a context where the defendant and plaintiff were
unrelated "strangers," such as grade-crossing collisions and spark-ignited fires. For a broader
reading of the applicability of the negligence principle, see generally Schwartz, Tort Law and
the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981).
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servations would be ancient history. Such was not the case. Although the
privity doctrine and the "unholy trinity" of workplace injury defenses had
been retired to the archives of tort lore, governmental entities, charities,
and family members still enjoyed immunity from suit; landowners contin-
ued to rely upon the status of entrants to limit their liability; and, in a more
general sense, a variety of "custodial" parties (institutional caretakers,
storeowners, landlords, and the like), were shielded from liability as long as
a colorable claim existed that an accident arising out of their contact with
the victim was associated with "a mere failure to act."
Around 1960, these barriers to claims began to fall. 8 Within the short
span of a decade, most state courts had overturned or sharply limited all of
the major immunities. For purposes of tort liability, the status characteris-
tic of a municipal entity, charity, or related family member no longer cre-
ated a roadblock to injury claims. In like fashion, many courts followed the
landmark California decision in Rowland v. Christian,99 abolishing the sta-
tus distinctions among land entrants and creating a general foreseeability
test as the standard for landowner and occupier liability. Even highly spe-
cialized professionals found that their conduct no longer went unquestioned
on "policy" grounds." °'
Simply to identify these discrete instances of expansion in the duty
concept, however, is to miss the larger meaning of this period of ferment.
Apart from the immunity situations, a central touchstone of the duty con-
cept traditionally rested on a distinction between action and inaction.101
The landowner cases are, in fact, illustrative. The restrictive categories of
landowner liability were premised in part on the view that no affirmative
obligations should be imposed in favor of "strangers." One who created a
trap or acted with reckless disregard for the safety of a "tolerated" entrant
might be held responsible for harm, but the hapless victim of a landowner's
passive failure to maintain safe surroundings had to bear his or her own
loss."o,
This theme, often characterized as a distinction between nonfeasance
and misfeasance, traditionally cut a wide swath in tort law. It is perhaps
most familiar in the rescue cases, where the illustrations are so
vivid-consider the man beside the railroad tracks indifferent to the peril of
a child threatened by an oncoming train. It is also apparent in more prosaic
settings where injury resulted simply because an unconcerned observer felt
98. See Schwartz, supra note 95, at 964-70.
99. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
100. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (therapist's duty of affirmative action to an endangered third party).
101. See Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts, 44 AM. L.
REG. 209, 273, 337 (1905).
102. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 412-15.
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no obligation to make a reasonable effort to prevent harm from occurring to
a heedless victim. 10 3 Still another variant on the nonfeasance/no duty
theme-and the most prominent, in my view-includes the many situations
in which a collateral relationship between the parties did in fact exist: the
victim rented a boat, leased an apartment, or shopped at the store of the
potential injury preventer, but fell prey to harm outside the narrow perime-
ter of the formal transactional relationship.0°
In all of these cases the link between inaction or nonfeasance and the
status relationship of the parties is subtle. The coldhearted bystander beside
the railroad tracks clearly did not base his claim to tort immunity on mem-
bership in a defined category analogous to a government employer or prod-
uct manufacturer. Nonetheless, it was his status as a stranger, in the strong
sense of lacking any responsibility for the victim's plight, that shielded the
indifferent onlooker from legal responsibility. Similarly, the shopkeeper or
landlord could rely upon formalistic notions of "control" to limit liability to
customers and tenants, respectively. Here again, privity-like conceptions of
the boundaries of the commercial relationship between the parties created
the basis for a narrow, particularized duty of reasonable care.
In the past twenty-five years, these status considerations have been
dramatically reversed. It is not simply that status no longer creates immu-
nity in the inaction cases; rather, the very status boundaries which formerly
were translated into no-duty rules are now frequently the foundation for
affirmative obligations to protect potential victims from the risks imposed
by third parties. In classic common law fashion, the status relationships
which have in recent years been relied upon as a basis for obliterating the
nonfeasance-misfeasance distinction-relationships including landowner-
tenant, storeowner-customer, and therapist-patient, among others"' -
have reduced the domain of protected inaction to the point where it is now
the exception rather than the rule.
How might one account for this striking reversal of field? The broadest
explanation would be that a sea change has occurred in the American ethos
of individualism. The argument would go something like this: Where once,
not so long ago, the dominant moral vision stressed the virtue of personal
autonomy, and left no room for governmentally mandated other-regarding
conduct, a new sense of community has arisen that recognizes the claims we
all have on each other for assistance in cases of fundamental need.
Certainly, many of the social welfare programs, dating back to the
New Deal, provide evidence that American society has moved beyond a
103. The classic instance is Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 A. 809 (1897).
104. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 373-85.
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 314A, 320 (1965). Cf.
Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976).
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staunchly libertarian ethic, assuming it was once pervasive. Still, it is one
thing to detect widespread popular assent to a brand of welfare capitalism
and quite another to deduce strong tendencies towards a communitarian
ethic of interpersonal behavior. In the political sphere, the continuing resis-
tance to comprehensive social insurance, let alone more modest no-fault
schemes, surely argues otherwise.
In my view, it seems more likely that the recent status-based exten-
sions of the duty of affirmative action are yet another manifestation of the
powerful theme of enterprise liability in tort law, but with a special twist.
As I suggested earlier, enterprise liability thinking has grown far beyond its
initial domain of industry responsibility for harm; professional and service
activities have likewise been fitted to the logical pattern which stresses the
accident prevention and risk-spreading potential of liability in tort. Thus,
the therapist who fails to warn an unknowing third party of the homicidal
tendencies of his or her patient is viewed as better situated to serve as an
accident preventer and risk spreader than the prospective victim of harm
related to the counseling activity.106 In similar fashion, courts have fash-
ioned norms that extend legal responsibility to a landlord whose failure to
accident-proof a residence leads to violence against a tenant, or to a busi-
ness establishment whose parking area poses risks of armed assault that
come to fruition in the case of an invited user. 10
In each of these situations, it is possible to argue that the provider of
the "activity"-whether offering therapy to patients or groceries to custom-
ers-is better positioned than the unwitting victim to warn, guard, or take
whatever other steps seem reasonably necessary to avoid danger or, in the
event of harm, to treat the loss as a cost of doing business. The question is
why this almost formulaic rationale for liability was extended in recent
years to these traditional nonfeasance scenarios; the answer, in my view, is
bound up in a ubiquitous feature of post-midcentury life in America-the
terror of urban violence.
The paradigm case of the impassive bystander at the railroad tracks
may still retain its vitality, but it is little more than an interesting academic
exercise. The cases that arise-in which the claims to "bystander" treat-
ment are increasingly denied-involve hospitals, commercial establish-
ments, and, most frequently, residential settings, where danger lurks at the
perimeter of daily activity and public concern has reached unprecedented
heights. Nineteenth century notions of individual autonomy seem particu-
larly inapt in these cases. The duty of affirmative action has grown in re-
sponse to recognition that the ability to maintain public safety is beyond the
106. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976).
107. See, e.g., cases discussed in M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 14, at 176-83.
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capacity of the police acting alone, and that service providers engaged in
high risk activities bear certain public responsibilities.Y8
2. The Recognition of Intangible Interests
The nineteenth century view of duty to avoid unintentional injury was
not only highly particularized, emphasizing status relationships; it was also
grounded in the requirement of tangible physical harm. While pain and
suffering was a recognized component of damages, it was recoverable only
when the injury victim suffered physical harm as well. Taken to its extreme,
in the "impact requirement" cases, the courts were explicit about the fact
that no recovery for emotional distress-as it came to be known-would be
allowed in the absence of a wrongful contact with the injured party, how-
ever slight.'0 9
This rule, which now seems so anachronistic, continued to be dominant
throughout the first half of the twentieth century, reflecting a suspicion
about the genuine character of emotional distress, a conviction that one had
to bear the psychological hard knocks in life, and a concern that recognition
of emotional distress would open the floodgates to fraudulent claims. It was
not until 1961, for example, that New York took the major step of an-
nouncing that henceforth there might be recovery for emotional harm with-
out the talisman of actual contact.'10 And it was near the end of the same
decade before California issued a landmark opinion establishing a circum-
scribed right to recover for "indirect" emotional harm from the shock of
eyewitnessing a serious injury to another."'
The duty concept in emotional distress cases has been in constant flux
throughout the quarter century since these developments began. The courts
have divided on whether "direct" emotional harm should be actionable only
when a consequence of fear of physical harm or, more broadly, whenever
distress might be a foreseeable result of an unreasonable act.', 2 Similarly,
judicial views have differed on the question of linking bystander recovery
for emotional distress to presence in a "zone of danger" or some other limit-
ing circumstances." 3 More recently, courts have struggled with a variety of
108. On police liability, see Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d
70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985); DeLong v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717,
469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983); Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94
HARV. L. REV. 821 (1981).
109. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 362-65.
110. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
111. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
112. Compare Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961) with Molien v.
Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
113. Compare Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)
with Bovsun v. Sanpieri, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984).
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second generation issues ranging from the limits on consortium actions to
claims of emotional distress for cancerphobia and related toxic exposure
concerns.114
Not all of these potential extensions of the duty concept have been
judicially recognized. Once again, however, tort law has been subjected to
considerable turbulence after an extended period in which the law seemed
entirely impervious to change. A survey of the tort scene in 1960 might well
have missed the issue of recovery for negligently caused emotional distress
altogether.
An initial cut at understanding the legitimation of emotional distress
claims requires a careful look at other areas of tort law. During the same
period that emotional distress has been afforded new recognition, a number
of related developments have occurred. Pain and suffering awards, attend-
ant upon physical harm, have assumed a new order of magnitude;" 5 intan-
gible loss claims in wrongful death cases have broken their century-long
shackles;"16 defamation awards entered by juries have reached extraordi-
nary proportions."17 In all of these cases, the notion of intangible loss was
viewed in relatively modest terms not so long ago-in keeping with a
broader view that the core of compensatory redress was the out-of-pocket
loss suffered by an injury victim as a consequence of physical harm.
The next level in understanding these developments is more specula-
tive. As before, the issue is whether there are exogenous circumstances in
the past twenty-five years that help explain the emerging sense that intangi-
ble loss had been inappropriately ignored or undervalued in earlier years. In
my view, changing cultural attitudes provide an insight."" By the 1960s, in
widening circles resort to mental health professionals was no longer re-
garded as an exotic move. While it is hard to pinpoint precisely the change
in social acceptability, by the late 1960s the legitimacy of seeking profes-
114. See supra note 74, and, on consortium actions, compare Borer v. American Air-
lines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977) with Ferriter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980).
115. A recent ICJ survey estimates that the average growth in compensation paid per
liability claim in accident cases has been rising at the rate of 12% annually in auto cases and
17% in non-auto cases between 1981 and 1985. See J. KAKALIK & N. PACE, COSTS AND
COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION, xii (1986). Unfortunately, these data are not bro-
ken down as to economic and non-economic loss, but it seems a logical inference (despite
inflation in medical costs) that a substantial part of the growth is due to a more expansive view
of intangible loss.
116. See, e.g., Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980).
117. See J. GOODALE, SURVEY OF RECENT MEDIA VERDICTS, THEIR DISPOSITION ON
APPEAL, AND MEDIA DEFENSE COSTS, IN MEDIA INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT, 78-80
(1985) (summarizing data collected by the Libel Defense Resource Center).
118. For a similar view of the compensation phenomenon in the defamation area, see R.
SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 15-25 (1986).
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sional assistance for mental health problems had taken a notable leap for-
ward. At the same time, organizations such as the Esalen Institute and
Erhard Seminar Training (EST) were achieving growing popularity and re-
ceiving widespread publicity. During the 1970s, in a related sequence, a
popular literature emerged that was devoted to self-help measures in deal-
ing with anxieties and overcoming various impediments to a positive state of
mind.
The common core of these superficially disparate events was a develop-
ing preoccupation with emotional health and getting one's life under con-
trol-stress, anxiety, and depression came into the popular consciousness as
legitimate concerns. As a corollary, the shocks associated with extraordi-
nary emotional and psychic distress were no longer viewed as inevitable
risks of everyday life to be borne in stoic fashion. Emotional distress came
to be seen as costly and unnecessary-a departure from a norm of mental
well-being. In this context, the substantial value attached by tort law to the
protection of emotional tranquility seems to be the logical outcome of the
transformation of emerging social attitudes into legal norms.
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
At the doctrinal level, accident law has been based on the fault princi-
ple for some two centuries. Present day rules of liability in auto accident
cases can be traced back to horse-and-buggy days just as existing principles
governing professional malpractice have their antecedents in nineteenth
century (and earlier) customary standards applicable to innkeepers and
common carriers.
But the superficially enduring character of the fault principle is illu-
sory, both in historical and contemporaneous terms. Although the nine-
teenth century version of negligence appeared to be an all-embracing
scheme, it was hemmed in by immunities, limited conceptions of duty, and
restrictive definitions of due care. The fault principle promised far more
than it delivered, and in many ways the negligence system continued to
operate under major constraints through the mid-twentieth century. More-
over, the internal constraints on accident law were reinforced by exogenous
factors, namely, bounded cultural definitions of legal responsibility and lim-
ited social conceptions of "victimization." An accident victim's perception
of actionable harm was modest when compared to present sensibilities.
These diverse limitations on the reach of the fault principle provided
implicit support to the longstanding corrective justice model of accident
law. By keeping the demands on the system within tolerable limits, the par-
simonious law of negligence concealed the potentially troublesome costs of
maintaining a two-party perspective based on a determination of "fault."
In present day terms, the continuity of accident law principles is simi-
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larly misleading, but for strikingly different reasons. If anything, the sys-
tem-at a conceptual level where negligence and risk-utility analysis re-
main foundational principles-promises less than it delivers, because the
underlying corrective justice notion of liability based on unreasonable con-
duct has, in many instances (often defacto), been supplanted by a distribu-
tional norm of assigning costs to appropriate activities. This critical shift in
ideology to a norm of enterprise (and activity-based) liability has been
driven by changes in technology, the advent of near-universal liability insur-
ance, the liberalization of social attitudes towards compensation, and the
breakdown of deferential status conceptions. The immediate consequence
has been tremendous stress on a system designed to achieve corrective
justice.
A word about the future. At some point, if the system were to become
totally schizophrenic-arriving at an unqualified commitment to distribu-
tional norms of activity-based liability under the guise of a process narrowly
designed to do corrective justice-a breakdown might be unavoidable. But
history indicates the durability of the fault system. In the absence of a
broad-based social welfare movement, such as the Progressive Era impulse
that triggered adoption of workers' compensation schemes, the negligence
system-supplemented by selective commitment to strict liability and no-
fault-is likely to be with us for some time to come.1 9 In terms of its stay-
ing power, the expansive capacity of the fault principle can be viewed as its
greatest virtue as well as its deepest vice.
119. For a detailed development of this thesis, see Rabin, Some Reflections on the Pro-
cess of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 13, 15-23 (1988).
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